Managing uncertainty is an integral part of making well-informed engineering decisions. When formulating a design problem, many of the variables and models contain epistemic uncertainty, uncertainty due to lack of knowledge. If this lack of knowledge is significant, it may be advantageous to acquire additional information before making a design decision. In this paper, we develop a framework for identifying which sources of epistemic uncertainty should be reduced to improve the overall quality of the design decision.
INTRODUCTION
Engineering design is a sequential and iterative process, consisting of the phases of product planning, clarification of task, conceptual design, embodiment design, and detail design [1] . Decision-based design research recognizes the pivotal role decisions play in each of these phases of the design process [2, 3] . Each decision in turn has two phases-problem formulation and problem solution. The focus in this paper is on the problem formulation phase in which a design decision is framed by defining the decision alternatives, modeling the potential outcomes of choosing each alternative, and modeling the decision maker's (DM) preferences for these outcomes [4] . How the design problem is formulated influences not only the solution, but also the cost of solving the problem. We focus specifically on determining which information to acquire in support of a design decision.
In all engineering design scenarios, limited information is available to the DM. This lack of information results in uncertain predictions of the consequences of engineering decisions. Although the predictions will always remain somewhat uncertain, one can reduce such uncertainty by acquiring more information or by improving the predictive models. This leads to a metalevel information management decision: "How much information should be acquired in support of a design decision?" This is not a trivial question, because it involves a value trade-off: acquiring information requires resources and should therefore only be considered if the expected value-in terms of an improvement in the outcome of the decision-exceeds the cost.
To guide the design engineer in this information management decision, we build on the principles of information economics [5] [6] [7] , namely, that one should maximize the expected net value of information. The net value is defined as the value gained by using the information minus the cost of acquiring the information. By optimizing the net value function, the DM is able to find the amount of information to acquire for each uncertain quantity in a design problem.
The concept of value of information has been used previously in the context of engineering design while incorporating the cost of decision making [8] , for model selection [9] , and for catalog design [10] . Within our research group, we have further developed these ideas [11, 12] and have come to the conclusion that it is important to distinguish between two types of uncertainty: variability and imprecision.
Variability is a description of naturally random behavior in a physical process or property. In the literature, it is also referred to as aleatory uncertainty, objective uncertainty, and irreducible uncertainty. From an information management perspective, this type of uncertainty cannot be reduced by acquiring additional information (although it may be possible to reduce variability by modifying production processes and either eliminating noise factors or making processes more robust to noise factors [13] ).
Imprecision, sometimes called epistemic uncertainty, incertitude, reducible uncertainty, or subjective uncertainty, is due to a lack of knowledge or information. Unlike variability, imprecision can be reduced by acquiring additional information. If one were to acquire an infinite amount of information, one would reach a state of perfect information in which only inherent, irreducible variability remains [14] . There are many sources of imprecision in engineering design [15] , including simplified behavioral models, limited statistical data, incompletely elicited preferences, and unknown physical relationships.
While traditional information economic approaches combine imprecision and variability into precise probabilities, our previous research has led to the conclusion that, from an information management perspective, it is beneficial to treat them separately and distinguish between them explicitly when representing uncertainty [11] . To separate these two types of uncertainties, we use a formalism called Probability Bounds Analysis (PBA) [16] , in which traditional probability distributions are extended into structures called probability boxes, or p-boxes.
A p-box refers to a set of cumulative distribution functions (CDF) bounded by an upper and lower CDF. Based on the currently available information, all CDFs that lie outside the p-box are not considered to be plausible characterizations of the underlying inherent variability. As more and more information is acquired for an uncertain quantity, the bounds on the quantity's p-box converge towards the unique, precise probability distribution that characterizes the remaining irreducible variability.
Our research group has previously applied Probability Bounds Analysis to engineering design and information economics problems [11, 12, 15, 17] . In this paper we unify several of these previous contributions by introducing a new model for representing information acquisition scenarios. This model allows us to simultaneously consider multiple information acquisition scenarios including: acquiring information through physical experiments, refining predictive models, or obtaining additional information from experts. By integrating these models into an information management decision, the DM can determine which types and which amounts of information to acquire.
In the subsequent sections of this paper, we first establish the foundations of our approach, and then present models for information acquisition alternatives and the corresponding method for selecting the optimal alternative.
We end the paper with an illustrative example for the environmentally benign design of an electric vehicle. 
MAKING DESIGN DECISIONS UNDER IMPRECISION
We assume that the uncertain state of the world s can be represented with the m uncertain quantities 1 2 , , , m p p p … in the decision problem. In general, however, the precise probability distributions are not known and the uncertain quantities i p are represented as p-boxes or sets of probability distributions [11, 19] :
where F and F represent the upper and lower bounds of the uncertain quantity's CDF. For each combination of precise distributions within the p-boxes, there is a corresponding expected payoff, resulting in intervals of expected payoff when considering the pboxes as a whole. The true expected payoff for a given design alternative could lie anywhere within the interval depending on the actual underlying probability distributions of the uncertain quantities.
If the intervals of expected payoff do not overlap, the DM chooses the design alternative corresponding to the interval with the highest payoff -the other alternatives are dominated. However, when two or more alternatives have overlapping payoff intervals, the choice of the best design parameter is indeterminate [15] . Since the true expected payoff for each design alternative could lie anywhere within the interval, any design alternative in the set of nondominated alternatives could be the best choice; based on the currently available information, one cannot determine which of these alternatives is truly the best. 1 According to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory [18] , the DM should maximize the expected utility. We will assume a risk neutral DM and use the terms payoff and utility interchangeably in this paper.
When the PBA analysis described above results in indeterminacy, the designer can choose either of the following:
1. Make a decision under imprecision 2. Acquire additional information for the uncertain quantities
For the first choice, the DM must either select a single decision under imprecision using a policy such as maximax [20, 21] , maximin [22] , or the Hurwicz criterion [23, 24] , or adopt a set-based perspective using policies such as maximality [25] or Eadmissibility [21] . Using the maximin decision policy, the DM chooses the set of design parameters whose expected payoff interval has the largest lower bound. This is a conservative policy, but it guarantees that the design will not yield a payoff lower than a certain value. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 1 in which the design variable was selected under imprecision using the maximin decision policy. Due to the high degree of imprecision, the DM would not have made a decision yielding the highest payoff and would have paid the opportunity cost shown.
If the DM is unwilling to tolerate the lost opportunity cost due to the current imprecision, the second action listed above could be applied, namely, to acquire additional information. As information is acquired for each uncertain quantity in the design model, the interval bounds on payoff are reduced and the opportunity cost is decreased.
Since information comes at a cost, a tradeoff exists between the benefit gained from acquiring new information and the acquisition cost. To manage this tradeoff for each uncertain quantity in a design problem, we introduce a new uncertainty reduction method presented in the next section.
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY
If the DM encounters indeterminacy when making a design decision based on a set of payoff bounds, the DM can choose to reduce the epistemic uncertainty in the design problem by acquiring more information. In general, information for each uncertain quantity has a unique cost and value, so the DM must carefully choose the combination of uncertainty reductions that has the highest net value based on information economic criteria.
The relationship between the design decision and the meta-level uncertainty reduction decision is shown in Figure 2 . If after an initial computation of the expected payoffs no indeterminacy is detected, there is no need to reduce the uncertainty further and the DM can make the design decision by selecting the alternative with the highest expected payoff. If the expected utilities do result in indeterminacy, the DM's task is to maximize the net value of multiple information acquisition scenarios.
The following subsections present a methodology for solving the information management decision introduced above. The decision alternatives are first mathematically expressed as particular information acquisition alternatives. Next, the consequences of acquiring a particular amount of information are modeled in terms of the cost and uncertainty reduction for the uncertain quantities. Finally, the net value of information is derived and used as the selection criteria for information acquisition.
DEFINITION OF DECISION ALTERNATIVES
We define an information acquisition alternative X as a particular amount of information the DM can choose to acquire to support a design decision. 1 x could be the number of experiments performed to characterize the electrical resistance of a metal 1 p , or 2 x could be the additional number of finite elements added in a refined finite-element model for predicting 2 p .
Since it is possible that the cost of acquiring additional information outweighs the benefit of the uncertainty reduction, the DM could actually lose money by acquiring additional information. Therefore the DM must consider the null acquisition alternative
This alternative corresponds to the acquisition of zero additional information.
MODEL OF DECISION CONSEQUENCES
In this subsection, we describe how the information acquisition alternative i x for each uncertain quantity i p can be modeled and how several common types of information acquisition scenarios fit into the proposed model structure.
To predict the consequences of a decision alternative X from an information economic perspective, we need to establish:
1. What the cost of acquiring the information for the particular information acquisition alternative X is; 2. How the information reduces the epistemic uncertainty of the design problem.
We assume that the cost of an information acquisition alternative can me modeled as
where
represents the cost of acquiring information for a particular uncertain quantity i p . Note that the cost of the null acquisition alternative 0 X is zero.
In order to find the effect of a decision alternative X on the epistemic uncertainty of the design problem, each uncertain quantity i p must be represented as a function of the acquired information as follows:
As information is acquired for each i p , the bounding CDFs of each respective p-box are reduced and the overall epistemic uncertainty of the design problem is decreased.
In general, it is very difficult to find exact models for the upper and lower CDFs of p-boxes. To resolve this issue, the p-boxes may be parameterized such that the bounds on the parameters are adjusted as information is acquired. If the p-box parameters are labeled 1 n ζ ζ … , the uncertain quantities are represented as shown below.
It should be noted that it is impossible to know the exact form of a reduced p-box before the new information is actually acquired; all we can say about a new p-box is that it is encompassed by the original pbox. However, it is often possible to estimate the size of the new p-box. For instance, based on the mean and variance of statistical estimators of a Normal distribution, one knows that the variance of the mean estimator, 1 ζ μ = , decreases as the inverse of the number of samples. The interval for the mean can therefore be adjusted according to the variance of the new set of samples.
The nature of the cost and uncertainty reduction models depends on the information acquisition alternatives for the uncertain quantities 1 2 , , , m p p p … . The remainder of this subsection gives several examples of information acquisition scenarios and shows how each is modeled using the structure presented above.
Continuous or infinite acquisition alternatives
In the continuous case, the DM cannot consider all information acquisition choices individually and therefore must express the cost and uncertainty reduction as functions of i x -a continuous variable. Note that discrete cases in which the number of choices is infinite or very large can also be treated in this fashion. For example, if an uncertain quantity i p is the yield strength of a material, additional information can be acquired by performing uni-axial tensile strength tests. The DM can perform as many tests as desired within certain time constraints, so the cost and uncertainty reduction must be expressed as functions of the number of tests, i
x . As another example, consider adding additional elements i x to a finite element model representing a certain structure, i p . The finite element model becomes more accurate as more elements are added, and the epistemic uncertainty of i p is reduced. Since a virtually unlimited number of elements can be added to the finite element model, the DM has many choices to consider and must express the cost and uncertainty reduction in terms of the additional elements implemented.
Discrete and finite acquisition alternatives
In this case, a limited number of information acquisition choices are available to the DM. For example, an expert could offer to perform an analysis study for a particular uncertain quantity i p at three levels of effort: small, medium, or large ( , ,
Since a finite number of choices are available, the DM can evaluate each level of effort separately and decide which is most valuable. 
Although this is a trivial case, it is important to consider the effect of irreducible uncertain quantities on the overall uncertainty of the design problem.
DECISION SELECTION CRITERION
Information economic principles are used to make the information acquisition decision. The net value of a particular information acquisition alternative X relative to the null acquisition alternative 0 X is given below:
is the value of an information acquisition alternative.
The DM makes the final information acquisition decision by selecting the alternative * X corresponding to the highest net value, shown in Equation (7).
The remainder of this section presents a derivation of the bounds of
, explains how to use ambiguity preferences to select a particular net value function, then illustrates a process for solving Equation (7).
Bounding the value of an information acquisition alternative
The value of an information acquisition alternative is given by the change in realized payoff between a decision made using the alternative X and a decision made without acquiring new information ( 0 X ):
where * 0 a is the optimal design decision based on 0 X , * N a is the optimal design decision using the new information contained in X , and N s represents the DM's new beliefs about the state of the world given the additional information X . For new information to change the value of a design, the chosen design alternative must change, so it is assumed that the newly acquired information changes the DM's choice of design alternative such that Recall that the payoff ( ) , a s π of a decision is a function of the uncertain quantities 1 2 , , , m p p p … in the design problem. Since the uncertain quantities are modeled as p-boxes as described in the last section, the expected value of information is expressed as an interval of utility.
Ling and Paredis have derived bounds on the range of information value resulting from the use of more accurate models. Since acquiring information for uncertain quantities makes a design model more accurate, we are able to adopt a slightly modified version of their derivation in order to bound the value of information acquisition alternatives. Refer to [12] for a more detailed discussion.
First, to determine the upper bound on the value of information, consider the situation illustrated in Figure  3 . The possibility always exists that the lower bound, 0 U , of the utility interval for the current decision * 0 a is realized while the best possible utility, max U , for the new alternative * N a corresponds to reality. The upper bound on the value of new information is therefore given by the difference between these two quantities. Note that the upper bound on the value of an information acquisition alternative is independent of the new information acquired ( X ), but dependent only on the p-boxes determined from the null acquisition alternative 0 X :
Second, to determine the lower bound on the value of information, consider the situation illustrated in Figure  4 . The lower bound is found by considering the case in which the highest possible value of the original design alternative and the lowest possible value of the new alternative would be realized. This would be the case if the true expected utility for * 0 a is at the maximum 0 U of the utility interval given the current information acquisition alternative, and the truth at 
Note the difference between this expression and Equation (9) in which the upper bound on the value is determined based on the information state prior to information acquisition. The utility interval ( ) 0 U X Δ constructed using the new information acquisition alternative can theoretically lie anywhere within the larger interval
, depending on the realized p-boxes constructed from the newly acquired information. However, since our assumption in the previous section is that the predicted outcome of information acquisition is adequately modeled with particular p-boxes for each information acquisition alternative, the utility interval
is unique for a particular X .
It should be noted that the lower bound on the value of new information is always negative when the utility intervals at * 0 a and * N a overlap. This means that the DM could be losing utility by acquiring additional information. Although this may seem counterintuitive, it is due to the fact that it is always possible to be lucky in the current decision, for instance, by making the decision one would have made given perfect information. Any additional information can then only make the design decision worse.
Using ambiguity preferences to select the net value function
Once the upper and lower bound on the value of information have been established, a decision policy to break the indeterminacy due to potentially overlapping intervals of net expected value is needed. The Hurwicz criterion allows the DM to express ambiguity preferences with a pessimism index α , where 
Intuitively, the value of information should be zero if 0 X X = , but Equation (11) may not yield this result, because it does not consider the dependence that exists between the utilities before and after acquiring new information. In the case of the null acquisition, we know that there is perfect dependence so that we must consider the case of 0 X X = separately, as shown below:
( )
Selecting uncertainty reductions
The desired information acquisition alternative * X is found by substituting the net value function given by Equation (12) into the decision selection criterion in Equation (7). Figure 5 summarizes the optimization process used for solving Equation (7).
Once the DM finds * X , the information acquisition decision has been solved and the DM is ready to acquire the actual information for each uncertain quantity. If If * X is nonzero, the net value of an information acquisition alternative is positive, so the DM acquires the appropriate information and computes the range of expected payoffs based on the newly acquired information. The same process used to make the first information acquisition decision is then repeated until the net value of the optimal information acquisition alternative is zero.
In many cases, only one iteration of the meta-decision loop in Figure 2 is needed and the value of a second uncertainty reduction will be zero. However, if the newly acquired information deviates considerably from what was expected based on the previously obtained information, then further uncertainty reductions may be valuable to better characterize the uncertain parameters.
SOLUTION METHOD IMPLEMENTATION
The previous section explained how the DM formulates the information acquisition decision in design problems. However, it did not explain how the DM can practically arrive at a solution to Equation (7) for determining the desired information acquisition alternative * X . This section first explains some complexities of the net value function that the DM might encounter, then presents an optimization approach for solving Equation (7).
PROPERTIES OF THE NET VALUE FUNCTION
The optimization of the net value function ( ) net V X is complicated by the following properties of the function:
The function could be mixed discrete and continuous If the variables 1 2 , , m x x x … are associated with both discrete and continuous information acquisition, the net value function is discrete along certain dimensions and continuous along others. The DM must either select a robust optimization scheme that can handle both discrete and continuous information, or approximate the discrete information with a continuous function so that the entire net value function is continuous.
The function is computationally expensive
Computing the net value function requires finding the cost as well as the upper and lower bounds on the value of the given acquisition alternative. Fortunately, the upper value bound is independent of X , so it may be computed using the p-boxes ( ) defined by 0 X before the optimization begins. In addition, the cost of an information acquisition alternative is inexpensive to calculate in most scenarios. However, substantial computational expense is associated with the computation of the lower value bound. To find the utility range for a particular information acquisition alternative, m p-boxes must be propagated through the design model using PBA. Refer to [26] for a description of algorithms for computing with p-boxes.
The function is not generally smooth
Consider a single dimension of ( ) net V X in which experimental samples i x are acquired to characterize an uncertain quantity i p . The cost of the samples, the value gained, and the net value are displayed as a function of the number of samples in Figure 6 . Notice that the net value of the first sample is negative due to the fixed cost, but the value begins to increase after the first sample. The abrupt change in value for the first sample makes this function non-differentiable, preventing the direct application of gradient-based optimization algorithms in this scenario.
To successfully optimize the net value along this dimension, the case of acquiring zero information must be considered separately from all other points along the domain.
Next, consider a dimension of ( ) net V X in which several discrete uncertainty reduction options with uncorrelated values are offered. Since no gradient information is available, the DM has no other choice than to consider every discrete information alternative separately and pick the one that yields the greatest net value.
OPTIMIZING THE NET VALUE FUNCTION
Although in general these properties of the net value function would make the optimization problem in Equation (7) difficult, in practice the problem is very solvable for the following reasons.
Most engineering problems contain a large number, m , of uncertain quantities, but the information acquisition decision is usually dominated by a small subset of these quantities. Many of the uncertain quantities 1 2 , , , m p p p … can either be adequately approximated as precise probabilities, or no information will be available to further characterize the quantities.
Therefore a large number of the , , , m x x x … could be zero, reducing the number of optimization dimensions significantly.
Furthermore, the number of acquisition alternatives for discrete acquisition scenarios is usually very small or can be modeled as a continuous function. If the number of discrete alternatives is small for a particular i x , each alternative can easily be evaluated separately without concern for computational cost. For discrete scenarios with a large number of alternatives, the cost and p-boxes can be modeled as continuous functions that are generally easier to optimize than discrete functions.
The DM can avoid mixing discrete and continuous optimizations by implementing an outer optimization loop that cycles through each combination of discrete acquisition alternatives. The inner optimization loop considers the alternatives modeled as continuous functions and can converge quickly using a gradientbased optimization method if the number of continuous alternatives is small. For problems containing a large number of both discrete and continuous acquisition alternatives this exhaustive approach would be prohibitively expensive. Instead, one could coarsely discretize the continuous variables and use a genetic algorithm to find a reasonable first approximation to the global optimum. From this approximate optimum, a gradient-based method could then be used to refine the solution.
EXAMPLE PROBLEM
The application of the uncertainty reduction strategy described in the last two sections is explored in the context of an electric vehicle (EV) problem. A similar EV model was previously used in a compromise Decision Support Problem (cDSP) to illustrate the use of a life cycle analysis (LCA) in a design decision problem [27] .
The objective of the EV designer is to maximize the expected payoff of the vehicle. It is assumed that the payoff is a function of the vehicle's performance, cost, and of the total environmental impact, thus the problem falls in the classification of Environmentally Benign Design and Manufacture (EBDM). Refer to [28] for a detailed discussion of EBDM in the context of decision making under uncertainty.
The design decision considered here is the selection of the optimal number of batteries implemented in the vehicle. Note that the parameters of the EV model are selected to be realistic, but are generally not based on a survey of actual vehicle data. The example problem is designed to provide a practical application of the framework developed in the paper, but the main emphasis of the paper is on the analytical process, not the outcome of the EV model.
PERFORMANCE
The performance of the electric vehicle is quantified by the distance the vehicle can travel between battery charges. This distance depends on the weight of the vehicle and on the total energy contained within the vehicle's batteries. Since adding extra batteries both increases the vehicle weight and increases the energy stored in the vehicle, a tradeoff exists. The distance traveled between charges is given by Equation (13) distance efficiency b BW ED = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
where b is the number of batteries in the vehicle, BW is the unit battery weight, and ED is the battery energy density expressed in kWh/kg. The efficiency of the EV is given by Equation (14) ( ) 1 0.95 131 0.09 3600 efficiency VW
where VW is the total vehicle weight. The total vehicle weight is the sum of the weight of the batteries, the weight of the frame ( FW ), and the loading weight ( LW ) which includes the interior, drivetrain, wheels, sheet metal, etc.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
The environmental impact of the EV is assessed using the Eco-indicator '95 methodology in which an ecoscore value is assigned to each stage of the product's lifecycle [29] . Although a newer version of the assessment method is available (Eco-indicator 99, [30] ), we have retained the model described in [27] . It is assumed that the majority of the environmental impact of the EV is due to the production, processing, and disposal of the aluminum space frame, as well as the total electrical energy use of the vehicle during driving. Each impact is assigned an Eco-indicator rate (ecorate) which gauges the relative impact of a particular lifecycle stage in terms of ecopoints. The total environmental impact (LCA) is the sum of the four individual impacts standardized per distance traveled by the vehicle.
The total number of ecopoints normalized per kilometer traveled in the EV is given by Equation (15)
where each i represents a life cycle stage.
THE PAYOFF FUNCTION
The payoff function for the EV is a linear combination of the value of performance, environmental impact, and the vehicle cost, given by Equation (16)
where b is the number of batteries and X is a particular information acquisition alternative for the vehicle's uncertain quantities. Figure 7 shows an influence diagram for the payoff of the vehicle.
In order to find the value associated with performance and LCA, the designer's preferences were elicited with respect to environmental impact and performance. The distance preferences were fit to the sigmoid shown in Equation (17) and the LCA preferences were best fit to a line (Equation (18)). 
The cost of manufacturing the EV includes the aluminum cost, battery cost, loading weight cost, and fixed cost of the facility, manufacturing equipment, etc., shown in Equation (19) . 
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
We now apply, in a step-by-step fashion, the uncertainty reduction methodology to the EV problem described in the last section. The experiment proceeds according to the design framework in Figure  2 .
Step 1: Initialize uncertain quantities Table 1 presents the assumed p-box representations and initial information ( )
for each uncertain quantity in the EV example problem. Note that the environmental indicators are complex functions of variables such as local infrastructure, ecosystems, and climate, making them very difficult to characterize precisely. Because of the large degree of uncertainty in the ecorates and the lack of historical ecorate data, the environmental indicators are best represented by simple intervals (p-boxes with zero variance). The bounds of the intervals are 50% and 150% of the ecorate values calculated with the Eco-indicator 95 method, respectively.
Step 2: Compute the ranges of expected payoffs Using PBA, we can propagate the p-boxes established in Step 1 through the EV problem and arrive at intervals of expected payoff from the initial information. Figure 8 shows the payoff intervals as a function of the number of batteries in the EV.
Step 3: Check for indeterminacy Since the intervals in Figure 8 clearly overlap, the payoff of the EV contains indeterminacy. We now proceed to finding the maximum net value of an uncertainty reduction and selecting the quantities to reduce.
Step 4: Represent the information acquisition alternatives Table 2 shows the information available for acquisition x are discrete integers which represent zero, small, medium, and large uncertainty reductions, respectively.
Step 5: Model the information acquisition consequences In this step, we establish models for For LCA x and VL x , we assume that we are given the discrete cost and reduction options shown in Table 3 Since the energy density experiments ED x are assumed to be samples from a normal distribution, we use standard statistical confidence intervals on mean and variance to establish ranges on μ and σ [11] .
The upper and lower confidence interval bounds are shown in Table 3 , where t is the t-distribution, 2 χ is the chi-square distribution, n is the total number of samples, and μ , σ are the minimum variance unbiased point estimates given below e is the result of a single experiment.
Step 5: Optimize the net value of information
The maximum net value of information and the corresponding optimal information acquisition alternative are found using the optimization procedure in Figure 5 . For the EV problem, we apply a gradient based optimization routine for the energy density experiments.
The routine is repeated for every discrete combination of vehicle life and LCA reductions, and the combination that yields the highest maximum value is chosen.
The optimizer requires that the net value be expressed as a function of the information acquisition alternatives
The following sub-steps illustrate how the net value of information is found for each i X requested by the optimizer. 
Information Acquisition Alternatives
Energy Density Experiments
LCA Expert Analysis Table 1 and the resulting payoff intervals in Figure 8 . From Figure 8 , we see that
Optimization sub-step 2: Find the lower bound on the value of information for the given acquisition alternative
The lower bound on the value of information is different for each information acquisition alternative i X , so for simplicity we demonstrate how to find additional energy samples. The reduced interval is computed by first finding the p-box for each uncertain quantity using Table 3 and the given information acquisition alternative, then propagating each p-box through the EV problem. The lower bound on the value of this additional information is given by ( )
50 50 50 $2974
Optimization sub-step 3: Use ambiguity preferences to select the net value of information Step 6: Arrive at optimal set of uncertainty reductions and maximum net value of reduction This optimization procedure was repeated three more times for 1, 2, 3
The overall optimal information acquisition alternative was found to be * 120, 0,3, 2 X = with a maximum net value of $632.67 per EV.
Step 7: If net value is positive, reduce uncertainty and return to Step 1; else, make design decision under imprecision Since the maximum net value of an uncertainty reduction for the EV problem is above zero, the DM reduces the uncertain quantities by acquiring the information * X . Figure 11 shows the payoff interval bounds before and after the new information * X is acquired.
We now iterate back to Step 1 and reinitialize each ( )
in Table 1 such that the p-boxes incorporate the additional information * X as well as the original initial information. We save the reader from redundancy and note that the value of an additional uncertainty reduction is found to be zero.
The final design decision is therefore guided by the payoff intervals using * X as shown in Figure 11 . Note that indeterminacy still exists in the EV payoff intervals after the uncertainty reduction.
The remaining indeterminacy is accounted for by three factors:
1. Irreducible uncertainty of the loading weights a a = ) then the actual value of additional information is zero according to Equation (8) . Figure 11 indicates that the additional information * X did not change the DM's design decision, so the true value of the uncertainty reduction was $0. However, the total net value of an uncertainty reduction was predicted to be 633 3000 × $1,899, 000 = in the last section.
This apparent discrepancy is due to the nature of the EV's payoff intervals. The lower and upper payoff intervals bounds have maxima that occur at the same number of batteries according to Figure 8 . Highly symmetrical payoff functions such as this are unlikely to benefit largely from uncertainty reductions since the design decision is unlikely to change. Asymmetrical payoff functions have different forms for their upper and lower boundaries and are more likely benefit from an uncertainty reduction due to a design decision change after information acquisition.
RISK REDUCTION
Another way to measure the effectiveness of an uncertainty reduction is the amount of risk the DM reduces by acquiring additional information. The risk reduction can be gauged in terms of the difference in the lower bound of the payoff interval at the original design point using the information 0 X , and the new design point using the newly acquired information If we compare this value to the total cost of $188,000 for acquiring the information * X , we see that for every $1 we pay for acquiring information, we get more than $10 in risk reduction. Even though the DM did not gain any true value from reducing the uncertainty of the EV problem, the DM has the assurance that in the worst case payoff scenario, the design will yield more than 2 million dollars more than he or she originally expected.
SUMMARY
In the problem formulation phase of design, engineers often encounter large amounts of uncertainty and therefore must acquire additional information to enable better decisions. Using information economic criteria and principles of PBA, we developed a method for making information management decisions. The main contribution of this paper is a formal structure for incorporating multiple sources of uncertainty and multiple types of information acquisitions. The electric vehicle example problem illustrates that our methodology is practically applicable and results in a risk reduction when making design decisions. Figure 11 : Payoff interval bounds after information acquisition and uncertainty reduction
